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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper discusses issues related to risk management, governance, and financing of 
public-private partnerships transportation projects. The allocation of risks and the 
requirements for ownership and equity provision were examined through analysis of a 
range of contracts. Lessons learnt from a series of Australia’s public-private partnerships 
transportation projects are also presented. The results showed that from the perspective 
of risk allocation, the arrangements were consistent among the projects. Some 
fluctuations, however, were observed in terms of equity provision. Initially, the contracts 
were developed based on the private sector taking full traffic demand risk and promising 
outcomes led to revenue sharing clauses being introduced. Consequently, overoptimistic 
demand forecasts resulted in the market rejecting the acceptance of traffic demand risk. 
The paper also presents the variation between the case study projects in terms of excess 
revenue sharing. The analysis also suggests that, in arranging these types of projects, 
traffic demand issue would be prominent and should be given major concern since it 
would be closely related with the revenue of the projects, which in turn would affect the 
equity of the projects.  
 
Keywords: Risk Management, Governance, Financing, Public-Private Partnership, 
Transportation Projects. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are now an accepted mechanism for infrastructure 
provision in most countries.  The system of contracting was pioneered in France by 
using a Concession Model and this was widely implemented in the UK through Private 
Financing Initiative (PFI) (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005). Following the UK, Australia, and 
then South Africa, Canada, Europe and now USA, this type of contract has been 
developed to suit the local conditions. It is considered a mature delivery option in 
Australia (Eggers & Startup, 2007). The market maturity level is measured through the 
perspective of the public sector by how the PPPs contract are organized, commencing 
from the development of regulatory regime and the establishment of special agency to the 
refinement of the arrangement.  
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This paper focuses on early Australia’s PPPs transportation sector projects prior to the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 2007-2008, taking into consideration that this market 
sector is deemed to be the most mature market in Australia and accounted for 25% of the 
total number of PPPs projects in Australia (Eggers & Startup, 2007). The discussions in 
this paper are based on the substance of the contracts acquired from the official 
government websites and related company websites. However, these discussions are 
limited to most of the contracts in the form of contract summaries, not the original 
contracts. The main topics in this paper are categorized into three major parts: risk 
allocation, equity arrangements, and revenue or payment arrangements. This paper uses 
critical appraisal and constructive dialogue techniques to analyze the contractual 
arrangement of the case study projects. The objectives are to identify the consistency of 
the arrangement and the most crucial risk in PPP transportation projects, and based on the 
latest development, to reflect on the materialization of the risk and the current condition 
of the case study projects.   
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Governance of PPP Projects  
 
Governance issues in PPP projects are influenced by many factors. Grimsey and Lewis 
(2004) suggest that PPPs use contract management and reporting systems as a basis for 
governance. Their framework focuses on risk management and the specific involvement 
of government. Meanwhile, Devapriya (2006) discusses the influence of the financing 
arrangements on governance of PPP projects and explains that this in turn would influence 
the effectiveness of the performance of parties involved in the concession. In addition, 
Reijners (1994) through his investigation on PPP projects in Netherlands has found that 
the governance structure should be sophisticated enough to accommodate the conflicting 
interest of parties involved in order to avoid a breakdown of the trust that is necessary in 
PPPs.  
Another issue that closely relates to the governance of PPPs is that of the incomplete 
contract. This issue was also highlighted by Sarmento and Renneboog (2016) in their 
theoretical and empirical research on the impact of incomplete contract to PPP projects. 
This issue along with the nature of long term duration of the PPP contracts have forced 
the parties involved in projects to conduct renegotiations which in the worst case could 
substantially change the contracts. In this case, the flexibility of the government is the 
pivotal factor. Contractual dispute could be experienced due this ambiguity and the 
incomplete nature of the contract which require involvement of third party mediation or 
an arbitration process, or in a worse case, a judgment by law courts (Sclar 2015). 
The complexity of these long-term contracts means that it is generally impossible to 
specify all potential outcomes in the contract documents and specification. Consequently, 
not all of the performance obligation of parties involved in the arrangement can be 
specifically defined in the contract that would eventually add the complexity of the 
contractual relationships which requires ongoing management of change and adjustment 
events. A typical governance structure is presented in the following figure (see Figure 1). 
In Malaysia, the general form of a PPP project follows the structure as presented in Figure 
2. 
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The basic foundation of PPPs is an optimal allocation of the risks between public and 
private sectors (HM Treasury UK, 2007; Partnerships Victoria, 2007). Different parties 
have different perspectives and interests on risks. This has been clearly shown by a study 
conducted by Grimsey and Lewis (2002) on the waste water treatment facility in Scotland 
that sound management of the conflicting issues or interests of parties on risks played an 
important role in the success of the project. However, such arrangements are hard to 
replicate. Not only may the risk allocation be confronted with complexity and 
unpredictability in terms of financial consequences, but it also has to be in line with the 
demands of important stakeholders and the community (Ng & Loosemore, 2006). The 
willingness of parties to bear the risks should they materialize is a key factor in 
optimization of the original risk allocation and is reflected in the amount of rate charged 
by doing so (Ward et al., 1991). And this, according to Ward et al. (1991), can only be 
achieved through robust and reliable risk management process. 
In terms of financing arrangement of the PPPs, the issue of bundling or unbundling 
a range of sub-projects in the contract is also highlighted as a complexity in governance 
arrangements. Devapriya (2006) has strongly argued that the governance of PPP is highly 
influenced by the debt and equity structure. Further, when it is closely linked with the 
management of the project, it would likely bring about a negative effect to the success of 
the project. This argument supports  the previous findings by Trujillo et al. (1998) 
through their analysis of Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) projects that the unbundling 
between the financing process through a ‘neutral’ Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) and 
other aspects of project such as construction and operation will likely produce a better 
end result.  
 
Figure 1. Typical PPP Structure 
Source: Akintoye, 2003   
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Figure 2. Typical PPP Structure adopted in Malaysia 
 
Source: Public Private Partnership (PPP) Guideline p. 9, Ukas, 2009 
 
Another issue with regard to governance of PPP projects is which type of governance 
should the projects follow: project governance or corporate governance.  Wilson et al. 
(2010) who had conducted an investigation on the Australia’s PPP found that the nature 
between the management of traditional projects and that of the PPPs would be 
significantly different due to the involvement of many parties in the project arrangement. 
They further argued that the term project governance, which could be seen as a merger 
between project management and corporate governance, would be more suitable for the 
arrangement. However, considering the long lifespan of projects, multiple-party 
involvement and social responsibility as consequence of longer contracting period, PPP 
governance is closer to that of the corporate governance type (Wilson et al., 2010). 
 
Good Governance of PPP Projects  
 
Because the issue of governance plays an important role in the success of the project, 
good governance principle becomes a key concern. This condition exists when two or 
more parties are involved and have interest in certain types of cooperation. Based on their 
research in the PPP projects in Indonesia, Abednego and Ogunlana (2006) have argued 
that governance is essential in ensuring the success of a PPP project since this type of 
project requires great strategic concern due to the nature of its long-term relationship. The 
success of the project is not only measured through short-term objectives in terms of 
budget, timeliness and quality but it also needs to consider the long term cost of operation 
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and maintenance. This will further raise issues of government support, proper project 
planning, good coordination between parties, trust, good tendering system, proper 
information dissemination and communication system, and high managerial capabilities 
(Abednego & Ogunlana, 2006). They have further suggested that project management 
should implement good corporate governance principles in the project. 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has 
developed Principles of Corporate Governance in their effort of building a better and 
reliable governance practice in OECD as well as non-OECD member countries (OECD, 
2004). Even though the principles are aimed at assisting mainly publicly traded 
companies, however with some adjustments, the principles can also be implemented in 
the privately owned companies (OECD, 2004). The Principles of Corporate Governance 
consist of the following six main elements: (1) assurance of the basis for an effective 
corporate governance framework; (2) the right of shareholders and key ownerships 
functions; (3) equitable treatment of shareholders; (4) the role of stakeholder in corporate 
governance; (5) disclosure and transparency; and, (6) the responsibility of the Board 
(OECD, 2004). 
The importance of good governance in PPP projects was also highlighted by Osei-
Kyei and Chan (2016) when analyzing three PPP transportation projects in Sub-Saharan 
African (SSA). They asserted that some strategic aspects of the projects such as 
stakeholder management, transparency, stable economic and political as well sound 
policy and regulations implementation would be critical in order to ensure 
accomplishment of successful PPP transportation projects. 
In summary, it can be inferred that good corporate governance mainly emphasizes 
on the protection and equal treatment for all stakeholders. Because the participants of the 
PPP projects comprise different parties with different levels of ownership and due to the 
long term nature of relationships in the project, it is very reasonable to include good 
corporate governance principles in the practice of project management in PPP projects. 
 
Financing in PPP Projects 
 
Apart from the recourse and non-recourse issues, project financing definition is now 
moving towards a focus on the repayment of debt or loan by initially evaluating the cash 
flows and revenue of the project (Nevit & Fabozzi, 1995). The main purpose of arranging 
project financing is to secure funding for the project without affecting the balance sheet 
of the funders or sponsors, hence completely none or as little recourse as possible. In 
addition to the refunds generation from the cash flow, project financing emphasizes on 
the separation of the project entity from the entity of companies involved in the 
arrangement and it is a project’s asset based focus (Finnerty, 1996).  
Risk phases also influence the arrangement of project financing. It is common for 
a green or new development project to have risks. There are three phases of risks which 
relate to the financing arrangement, namely, engineering and construction phase, start-up 
phase and operation phase (Nevitt & Fabozzi, 1995; Tinsley, 2000; Grimsey & Lewis, 
2002). Each phase has its own unique nature which will consequently influence the 
involvement selection by the lenders. In many instances, different risk phases or periods 
have different lenders (Nevitt & Fabozzi, 1995). Therefore, the risks profile of the project 
will later influence the financing arrangement.  
This financing arrangement is one of the prerequisites of the successful PPP 
projects due to the long-term arrangement of the contract in which there could be many 
of the macro-economic factors and fiscal conditions such as economic crisis, political 
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turbulence, and fuel price hike that are difficult to predict in advance. In many cases, re-
financing is required in order to cover the deficit which will be commonly introduced 
after the construction stage is accomplished. However, Villalba-Romero and Liyanage 
(2016) through their analysis of PPP projects in road development, have argued that 
refinancing poses a substantial risk that would be unfavorable for both the public and the 
private sectors. 
The sources of financing are mainly a combination of debt and equity. The structure 
of the debt and equity arrangement in PPP projects is directly associated with the 
governance of the project (Devapriya, 2006). The sponsor of the project will likely take 
the largest portion of the equity, which can be offered later to the purchaser, and the recent 
trend is that the equity is sold in the capital market (Finnerty, 1996). Besides functioning 
as a control mechanism, equity also represents a whole life ownership interest on the 
entity of the project.  However, one feature of equity is that there is no requirement of 
the project to pay back the returns to the equity holders at specific time (Marks et al., 
2005). These features will influence the decision of the companies involved in the PPP 
contracts whether or not to take part in the equity stand. 
There are a few factors which determine the parties that should take an equity stand 
(Finnerty, 1996). First, the provider takes liability when cost overrun occurs. Second, in 
longer construction period, the provider must be willing to defer the payment of dividends. 
Finally, the equity provider must be parties which will likely benefit the most profit from 
the project. Taking these factors into consideration, the equity providers could be one of 
these parties, that is, the purchaser of products, the owner of the resources, and the 
suppliers of products and services. Public or commercial equity investors are likely to 
invest at the later stage of the project lifecycle, or at least after the construction period has 
passed (Finnerty, 1996).  
In PPP projects, equity rarely covers all of the investment in the project. In fact, the 
biggest portion comes from debts. Debts can be acquired from commercial banks in the 
form of long term loans or can be from other sources such as from bilateral agencies or 
export credit agencies (ECAs) and multilateral agencies (MLAs) (e.g., The World Bank, 
IBRD, ADB, and IFC) and the also from the capital markets (Tinsley, 2000). 
Another option for investment in PPP projects is from a financing device which has 
both the features of debt and equity or in other words, debt-equity hybrid. Debt-equity 
hybrid can be described as a capital raising device which has both the features of debt and 
equity (HM Treasury, 2007). Some examples of hybrid mechanism are certain classes 
preference shares, convertible notes, capital protected equity loans, profit participating 
loans, perpetual debt, endowment warrants and equity swaps. The mechanisms are highly 
influenced by the taxation regime which affect the choice and financial arrangement of 
the financing scheme of the PPP projects.   
 
Project Risks Allocation Principles 
 
Appropriate risks allocation plays an important role in the success of the PPP projects and 
it is considered to be the impediment in the PPP arrangement due to the varying and 
uncertain risks faced by the PPP projects. Apart from the risks of technical nature, risks 
that arise from the stakeholders are more complex and difficult to control (Ng & 
Loosemore, 2007). Hence, the risks allocation is a major concern in the arrangement of 
PPP contracts.  
In terms of risks, the toll road or transport projects have a greater risk than those in 
other sectors, leading to the modest growth of the private financing involvement in the 
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transportation sector (Fisher & Babbar, 2000). Apart from the economic, construction and 
operation risks, the risks resulting from the issue of co-ordination with the regional 
government or planning agencies is also crucial in transport projects (Haley, 1992). 
Therefore, these risks require a systematic risk allocation between the public and its 
private counterpart through an active involvement of the public, government agencies, 
and private parties. 
In enabling the transfer of risks effectively, the arrangement should implement the 
ideal risks allocation principles; the bearers should be able to manage the risk outcome 
and the risks are allocated to the parties which would best be able to manage those risks 
at the lowest expenses (Medda, 2006). The complex arrangement in PPP projects revolves 
especially around two main partners, namely, the SPV and the procurer, which adds to 
the complexity of risk allocations. Based on their research in Scotland, Demirag et al. 
(2010) have argued that due to this complexity, in some cases, the risks may be transferred 
to parties that are not able to control or are not willing to bear them, and eventually will 
seek other mechanisms as compensation or attempt to avoid greater loss by using hedges, 
swaps and insurance. 
Hovy (2015) has also noted that the risk allocation is the main challenge in arranging 
the PPP projects. Two practices are commonly opted, which are transferring risks to 
private sector leads to higher premium cost and leaving the risks to the public sector that 
is better to cope the risks. However, these could cause reduction in value for money 
objectives and are in contradiction to the optimal risks allocation principles. He further 
makes a claim that unforeseen risks have also hindered the success of PPP projects. This 
is because the long term nature of PPP projects which could reach 30-40 years of contract 
duration. It is difficult to forecast risks in advance and during the contract period due to 
the dynamic changes caused by many factors such as those related to economic and 
political aspects.  
 
Revenue and Payment Arrangements 
 
One of ultimate risks in PPP transportation projects is the surety of revenue stream in 
compensating the investment (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002) which closely related with an 
accurate traffic demand forecasting (Eggers & Startup, 2007).  The inaccuracy of this 
forecasting at the initial phase will result in numerous re-negotiations during the contract 
period that may hinder and undermine the benefit of the private financing in involvements 
in the transportation projects (Guash, 2004). Hence, the contract should clearly stipulate 
this risk which also incorporates the sharing arrangement of potential excess of the 
revenue from the materialization of traffic that is higher than the base case scenario.  
Developing the legal and structured concession environment is one of the 
prerequisites when attempting to implement this financing arrangement (Fisher & Babbar, 
2000). As matter of fact, the concessionaire is likely required to pay more attention to this 
matter particularly at the project initiation stage to ensure that the contract would 
accommodate future uncertainty due to its long term nature and to minimize the re-
negotiation. One of the solutions is to conduct intense and detailed discussions with the 
counterpart, which in this case, is the government or the related agency at the initial stage 
of the project.  
There have been arguments in support of the importance of pre-negotiation of this 
aspect in the literature. For a project which has higher uncertainty in forecasting in the 
revenue stream at the initial stage, the public sector (government) should bear most of the 
risks or alternatively be willing to compensate the private counterpart when there is a non-
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materialization of the forecasted revenue (Ng & Loosemore, 2007; Eggers & Startup, 
2007). The main reason is because the certainty of long term revenue stream is essential 
for the achievement of value for money as one of the attributes of successful PPP projects 
(Grimsey & Lewis, 2002). Another alternative is by choosing a revenue mechanism 
whether it is market-tied or contract-tied mechanism (Haley, 1992). This can be then 
related to the nature of the service provided by the project whether or not it is directly 
affecting the users.  
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The methodology used in this paper is a desktop study of a theoretical examination 
through contract analysis. The contract data were acquired from the electronic resources 
of the official government agencies or departments and the companies involved in the 
PPP schemes. The limitation of this research is that even though the contract data were 
obtained from the official websites, most of the contracts were in the form of contract 
summary published by the government agencies or companies. Five sets of contract data 
were analyzed from the perspective of equity arrangement, risk allocation and revenue or 
payment arrangement. The case study focused on the transport PPPs projects in Australia 
consisting of Eastlink project (Victoria), Southern Cross Station (Victoria), Chatswood 
Transport Interchange (New South Wales), Sydney Cross City Tunnel (New South 
Wales), Westlink M7/ Western Sydney Orbital (New South Wales), and Lane Cove 
Tunnel (New South Wales). Data were analyzed using the theoretical framework as 
discussed in the review of the literature section of this paper. The analysis focused on the 
equity or investment arrangement, risks allocation, and reward or concession arrangement, 
especially regarding the arrangement of excess revenue. The expected outcomes were 
identification of sensitive issues underlying the early PPPs transport project in Australia 
pre-GFC and measurement of the consistency level of the contractual arrangement in the 
transportation sector. 
 
 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
Risks Allocation in Australia’s PPPs Transportation Projects 
 
The common list of risks in infrastructure project developed by Grimsey and Lewis (2002) 
is used as a platform in analyzing the risks allocation in this paper. The aims were: to 
examine the allocation of major risks in Australia’s PPPs transportation projects; to 
determine whether the allocation is consistent from project to project; and, to identify 
specific risks that require special attention. Table 1 presents the risks allocation of the 
case study projects which were investigated. 
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Table 1. Major risks allocation 
 
* Public sector has an obligation to support inflow traffic; different project has different 
arrangements. 
 
In terms of major risks allocation, the contracts showed that there had been a consistent 
type of major risks allocation in the early PPP transportation projects in Australia. Most 
of the projects’ risks were transferred to the private sector (i.e., technical/design risk, 
construction risk, operating risk, revenue risk, financial risk, and regulatory/political risk). 
Other risks were shared between the private and public sector (i.e., force majeure risk, 
environmental risk, and project default risk. Thus, this means that the transportation sector 
was considered to be a mature market of PPPs in terms of risks allocation.  
In Australia, both parties (public and private sectors) would generally have a right to 
terminate the contract if one of them was found to breach the contract. However, in some 
cases, the concessionaire could be granted extension of time to rectify their ‘default’ 
under special discretion.  
In regard to the revenue risk of toll and tunnel PPP projects, even though a risk would 
be borne by the private sector, there would be a special clause requiring the public sector 
to support the private counterpart, especially if this is related to the input traffic. Table 2 
shows the special involvement of the public sector in the input traffic arrangement.     
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Table 2. Traffic risk arrangement 
Project Traffic risk arrangement 
Sydney 
Cross City 
Tunnel  
(June 2003) 
x The traffic risk is transferred to the private sector. 
x “Clause 3.3.8 Traffic management and road network change”. 
The contract/project deed requires the Road and Traffic Authorities (RTA), the 
trustee and the company to build traffic arrangement which must be acquainted 
with the Cross City Tunnel’s “importance in the traffic system”. This means that 
both parties have an obligation to ensure that the minimum the traffic inflow to 
the tunnel as required by the economic base model is achieved. An alternative in 
accordance with this clause is to close and merge some of the existing traffic 
network. 
x The project deed also introduces clause 3.5 (Renegotiation provision) in regard to 
closing or reduction in traffic inflow to the tunnel.  
(Source: NSW Treasurya, 2007) 
Westlink 
M7 
Motorways 
(August 
2003) 
x The traffic risk is transferred to the private sector. 
x “Clause 3.3.8 RTA and Government road network, public transport and utility 
service development right and restriction”. 
x Even though that the traffic risk is transferred to the private sector and the RTA 
or New South Wales (NSW) government has a right to build any type of road 
network, the project deed stipulates that 50 traffic connections to the M7 
Motorway will not be diminished nor lessen. 
x The project deed also introduces a clause 3.5 (Renegotiation provision) in regard 
to the “competing road project”)  
 (Source: NSW Treasuryb, 2007) 
Lane Cove 
Tunnel  
(July 2004) 
x The traffic risk is transferred to the private sector 
x “Clause 3.3.8 RTA and Government road network, public transport and utility 
service development right and restriction”. 
x The RTA and NSW government has a right to “develop, operate, maintain, and 
extend” the NSW roads/networks. This including the existing tollways or 
freeways. However, the project deed stipulates that 12 traffic connections to the 
motorway will not be diminished nor lessen. 
x The project deed also introduces a clause 3.5 (Renegotiation provision) in regard 
to the specific road sections.  
(Source: NSW Treasuryc, 2007) 
Eastlink  
(November 
2004) 
x In general, the traffic risk is transferred to the private sector. However, the state 
has an obligation under the contract to provide “transport network support” in 
regard to the Principal Road Interface”. 
x A failure to provide this support is considered to be a breach to the contract. In 
regard to this failure, the contract introduces clause 45 (Key Risk Management 
Regime). According to this clause, there are two options for this failure, which 
are “Obligation to negotiate” and pursuance to expert determination (Clause 73 
Expert Determination). 
(Source: Victoria Treasury and Finance, 2007) 
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Equity Arrangement 
 
The equity distribution of the PPP transportation projects in Australia is presented in the 
following figure:   
 
 
Figure 3. Equity Distribution of PPP Transportation Projects. 
 
Figure 3 shows the fluctuation of equity stake by the parties involved in PPP 
transportation projects under study that the financial closing (awards) of the contracts 
between 2002 and 2004. Initially, the financiers took the lead by accepting 100% of the 
equity. Following that, role of the financiers was reduced because other equity providers 
were starting to play their role in providing equity. These included superannuation and 
financial firms. At the later stage, the equity provision was totally transferred to the public 
via the capital market. At this stage, the financiers’ role was only as the Initial Public 
Offering (IPO) underwriter of the shares and accepted only a minor sum of deferred 
equity, for example, in the Eastlink project. However, the role of the financiers as a leader 
of the PPPs transport arrangement remained unchanged. 
The constructor’s role in the equity stake was relatively constant at the level of ± 
20%. In some cases, the equity, ± 20%, was shared by two companies, either from one 
parent company or divided equally by two separate constructors such as in the Westlink 
M7 project.  
There were two forms of contractors’ involvement in the equity provision of 
Australia’s transport PPP projects: initial equity investors (i.e., Sydney Cross City Tunnel 
and Westlink M7 Motorways) and deferred equity investors (i.e., in Lane Cove Tunnel 
and Eastlink). The shows that the type of contractor’s investment also changed from 
initial equity investor to the deferred equity provider. Even though that the type of 
involvement changed from initial equity provider to deferred equity provider, the total 
investment of contractor remained constant at the level of ± 20% of equity.  
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Revenue and Payment Arrangement  
 
In general, there were two types of revenue arrangement in the PPPs transportation 
projects in Australia, namely, service payment and tolling system. The difference was due 
to the nature of the service provided. Service payment was applied in terminal building 
provision (Southern Cross station redevelopment) while the tolling system was applied in 
the toll road or tunneling projects. The summary of the revenue and payment arrangement 
of the PPP transportation projects in Australia is presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Revenue and payment arrangement  
No Projects Revenue Re-payment to the Government 
 
Land Lease Excess Revenue 
1. Southern Cross 
Station 
Redevelopment (July 
2002) 
Service 
payment  paid 
quarterly of a 
year 
 
None 
 
 
None 
 
2. Sydney Cross City 
Tunnel (June 2003) 
Toll 
 
 
 
 
x $1, plus 
x 35% share of 
Gross 
revenue from 
no-toll 
business 
 
Progressive increased 
share for excess more 
than 10% of the ‘base 
case financial model’ 
every period 
3. Westlink M7 
Motorways (August 
2003) 
Toll 
 
 
 
 
x $1, plus 
x A share of 
Gross 
revenue from 
no-toll 
business.  
 
Progressive increased 
share for excess more 
than 5% of the ‘base case 
financial model’ after six 
years of completion stage 
1 of the project. 
4. Lane Cove Tunnel 
(July 2004) 
Toll 
 
 
x $1, plus 
x A share of 
Gross 
revenue from 
no-toll 
business.  
Progressive increased 
share for excess more 
than 10% of the base case 
financial model every 
period. 
5. Eastlink (November 
2004) 
Toll 
 
 
 
$ 20 Million 
Freeway leases 
and land 
licenses 
Progressive increase in 
share of excess revenue 
varied periods. 
 
Several findings could be derived from Table 3. Firstly, for the all the toll road projects, 
the revenues were collected from the users by using electronic tolling system. Generally, 
the subscriber users’ vehicles would be equipped with the transponder. Some contracts 
would require the system to be able to recognize the vehicles not equipped with the 
transponder. 
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Second, some differences were observed in terms of their excess revenue 
arrangement. If the revenue exceeded the ‘economic base case model’ proposed by the 
company or trustee in the project deed, the government would have a right for a share of 
the exceeding revenue. For tunnel project (i.e., Sydney Cross City Tunnel and Lane Cove 
Tunnel), the arrangements were similar (see Figure 5). For toll road projects, each of them 
would have its own specific arrangement. In M7 Motorway project, the excess sharing 
was similar throughout the contract period (see Figure 4) while for the Eastlink project, 
the contract period was divided into some periods with its own excess sharing 
arrangement (see Figure 6). This would imply that there was an optimistic projection that 
revenue from the PPPs transport project would exceed the base economic model proposed 
by the company/trustee. That could also be seen as opportunity from the perspective of 
the public sector to be actively involved in arranging the transport network to ensure the 
traffic inflow would exceed the proposed model.  
Third, because the biggest risk in a PPP transportation project is revenue risk; the 
private sector will likely become cautious in regard to the surety of traffic inflow. The 
public sector/government involvement is still required to ensure that the traffic network 
is properly arranged. 
Fourth, another important issue in regard to the traffic arrangement was the main 
stakeholder interest, that is, the public or the users. Prior to the implementation of certain 
traffic network arrangement (such as merging, closing, and widening) in the contract, 
both parties would have to consider the resistance from the public towards the 
arrangement. This resistance would significantly influence the revenue for the private 
sector and the image of the project which in turn would give a bad impression of the 
project success.  
Finally, because the duration of the PPP contracts would normally be more than 20-
25 years, it is imperative that the arrangement should be discussed thoroughly before the 
contract would be effected in order to avoid dispute and prolonged renegotiation. 
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Figure 4. Shared Excess Revenue for Eastlink 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Shared Excess Revenue for Cross City Tunnel & Lane Cove Tunnel 
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Figure 6. Sharing Excess Revenue for Westlink M7 Motorway 
 
Latest Progress and Information on the Case Study Projects 
 
From the five case study projects, three of them, namely, Sydney Cross City Tunnel, Lane 
Cove Tunnel, and Eastlink, had faced commercial burden. The main reason was because 
the highest risks, which was the demand risk, would be materialized that in all cases the 
projected traffic demand was not achieved. The worst case had been experienced by the 
Sydney Cross City Tunnel which had asset that had to be sold to other investors. It was 
clearly evident that traffic demand would be a crucial risk; failing to meet the projected 
traffic flow would affect the revenue which would eventually influence the equity.  
The findings of case study analyses of several PPP transportation projects in Europe 
by Roumboutsos and Pantelias (2015) have also suggested that revenue risk is crucial in 
transportation projects. Another issue raised in this analysis is the issue of integration of 
the project(s) into the greater transportation network which could influence the flow of 
traffics as the main source of revenue for the transportation project and could undermine 
the projects’ success especially after the commencement of operation phase. 
The latest analysis on Australia’s PPP transportation projects was presented by 
Hodge and Duffield (2010) in which two projects were highlighted: the CityLink and 
Southern Cross Station projects (both in the state of Victoria). In the CityLink Project, 
most risks including construction, design, operation, financing and market risk, were 
transferred to the private sector. In this CityLink project, a bank, that is, Macquarie Bank, 
took the lead in the financial and project arrangement via its Infrastructure Investment 
Group. The Southern Cross Station Project was an upgrading project of an existing 
railway station. A similar risks arrangement was observed. The biggest risk in this project 
was borne by the private sector operating the existing station which the private sector 
must ensure that the station remained operational during upgrading work. In terms of 
financing, ABN Amro led the arrangement by contracting Leighton Contractors, 
Honeywell and Delaware North Australia to deliver and operate the development, via 
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SPV named Civic Nexus (DTF Victoria 2016). These two transportation projects again 
highlighted the major involvement of banks (the financial sector) as the leaders or the 
biggest equity takers in the arrangement. 
A recent study by Carbonara et al. (2015) in the study of motorway PPP projects in 
Europe had identified five major risks: construction risks, revenue, financial risks, force 
majeure risks, and regulatory or political risks. The findings of this past study by 
Carbonara et al. (2015) had been similar to that of the current study presented in this paper 
which also indicated that the most critical risks in PPP motorway projects demand or 
usage risk corresponded to the revenue risks that had occurred during the operation phase. 
Further, Carbonara et al. (2015) also suggested a kind of risk sharing between private and 
public sector with regards to this risk through revenue sharing mechanism and revenue 
distribution mechanism. 
The recent findings by these researchers of past studies have thus confirmed the 
findings of the current study presented in this paper. The highest risk is the traffic demand 
or revenue risk. However, other risks such as construction risks, revenue, financial risks, 
force majeure risks, and regulatory or political risks, must also be given thoughtfulness 
especially at the early phase of the procurement or starting at the business case 
development level. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
From the perspective of equity arrangement, risk allocation and revenue or payment 
arrangement, the PPP transportation projects in Australia had experienced a consistent 
arrangement which showed the maturity of this market sector. Inconsistency was 
observed only in the initial equity provision in which the amount of financier percentage 
had been reduced. However, the role of the financier as the leader of the project entity 
remained unchanged. In terms of the risks in transport projects, the most sensitive issue 
that had been given utmost concern by the contracts was the revenue or traffic 
arrangement risk.  
 
Thus, the following recommendations are suggested for further research in this area: 
x In regard to the PPPs transportation project, a thorough research should be conducted 
in order to find out the motivation of parties behind the willingness to put equity on 
the project. Firstly, from the contractor’s point of view, that is, whether the 
willingness is motivated by ownership interest, controlling interest, or just an 
obligation to show a commitment to the success of the project. Secondly, from the 
point of view of the financiers, whether the focus is on the motivation to bear whole 
equity of the project or to be shared with others. 
x Further research needs to be conducted is to find out whether the excess revenue is 
experienced by the PPP projects and to justify the effectiveness of the excess sharing 
revenue arrangement. This is important to ensure a fair arrangement is achieved, since 
the private sectors bear the revenue risk and whether this can be considered as an 
opportunity of both parties. 
x Studies should also be conducted in other PPPs’ sectors in order to: (1) determine 
whether the consistency of the arrangement has been achieved; (2) investigate the 
maturity of the market; and, (3) identify the unique features of PPP arrangement in 
other sectors compared with that of the transportation projects. Thus, the most 
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sensitive issue which may likely arise in creating a dispute for each sectors can be 
identified.  
x The main objective of a PPP contract is to achieve value for money. Because the 
contract period of PPP is relatively long (more than 25 years), there should be an 
empirical method measuring whether the project has successfully delivered value for 
money. Thus, the lesson learnt can be immediately implemented on the foregoing 
project. 
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